







Revisiting Domestic and Regional Security 
ibidem









When public protests first began in Ukraine at the end of 2013, the failed promise of 
the Orange Revolution was still fresh in the minds of many Ukrainians. However, un-
like in the aftermath of 2004-2005, the political and military crises ignited by the Euro-
maidan brought profound changes not only for Ukraine, but also for neighboring states 
and Europe more generally. The annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014, 
along with the outbreak of fighting in the Donets Basin, has resulted in a profound 
shift in how domestic and regional security is perceived. More broadly, these events 
have also called into question the durability of the post-Cold War world order, which 
had been based upon peaceful coexistence between states, the integrity of sovereign 
borders, and an acceptance of the legitimacy of international law.
While the effects of the Euromaidan have already been analyzed in terms of Ukrainian 
politics and relations between Ukraine, Russia, and the EU, what has not yet taken 
place is a sustained analysis of how its legacies have reverberated throughout the 
post-communist region and wider Europe (and how these altered international per-
ceptions have, in turn, affected the subsequent course of Ukraine’s domestic politics). 
Writing from a variety of viewpoints and backgrounds, this volume’s contributors seek 
to address these lacunae. Among other topics, they focus on Russia’s dissatisfaction 
with the post-Cold War international order, examine issues of ontological insecurity 
in an increasingly networked world, assess the limits of Western leverage, evaluate 
Ukrainian public opinion concerning NATO and the EU, consider the broader secu-
rity implications of the Euromaidan for Eastern Europe, explore the role of migration 
and demographic factors, and assess how issues of stateness and governance affect 
Ukraine’s domestic security.
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Yuriy Matsiyevsky 
Western Leverage, Russia’s Resistance and 
the Breakdown of the Yanukovych Regime 
My contribution seeks to assess Western and Russian influence on the 
collapse of Viktor Yanukovych’s regime. Drawing on the works of Levitsky 
and Way and Tolstrup, the chapter explains why during the 2014 crisis 
Yanukovych was able to withstand Western and domestic pressure much 
longer than Leonid Kuchma did in 2004, and why he was eventually 
toppled. I argue that Yanukovych’s ability to prolong his stay in power 
was circumscribed by three specific factors: his concentration of power, 
Russian backing and miscalculated Western threats to impose sanctions. 
His downfall, however, was ultimately determined from within the state. 
This chapter contributes to the theory of hybrid regimes by extending the 
concept of linkage and leverage to non-democracies; it also offers an 
empirical measure of Russian anti-democratic influence on Ukraine.   
Introduction 
Ukraine's 2013/2014 crisis is dissimilar to any other crisis in post-
independence Ukrainian history. Unlike in 2004, the 2014 crisis was 
not resolved through compromise and has grown into a revolution. 
Being under Western, Russian and domestic pressure, Ukraine's 
former president Victor Yanukovych had long struggled to keep 
power, but finally lost it. But why was Yanukovych in 2014 able to 
withstand these pressures for the first three months of the crisis, 
unlike Leonid Kuchma in 2004, and why did he finally fall? What 
was his personal role, and what role did external actors play in this 
process? In other words, how did the interplay of structural and 
agency-based factors contribute to the regime’s prolonged survival 
and eventual downfall? 
While much has been written about the international 
confrontation over Ukraine both before and after the 2014 
revolution (e.g., Wilson 2014; Menon & Rumer 2015; Charap & 
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Colton 2017; Götz 2018), much less attention has been paid to the 
actual amount of leverage the West and Russia possessed in 
relation to Yanukovych’s Ukraine. Both the regime’s capacity to 
withstand this pressure for 90 days of crisis (from 22 November 
2013 to 22 February 2014) and its sudden collapse need to be 
properly accounted for.  
This chapter draws on the theory of hybrid regime dynamics 
developed by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way (2010). Levitsky and 
Way advanced an overly structuralist argument in explaining why 
some regimes democratized while others did not. Way, for 
instance, has been criticized (Bunce & Wolchic 2009) for neglecting 
the role of agency in explaining regime outcomes. Another caveat 
is the role of so-called “black knights”—states capable of thwarting 
democratizing efforts. The authors only mention this, but they do 
not discuss it. An interesting attempt to further develop the theory 
is Jakob Tolstrup’s concept of “negative external actor” (2009). 
Although Tostrup applies this concept to compare Western and 
Russian influence on Ukraine (2014), he does not seek to measure 
it.  
Consequently, this chapter aims to contribute to these 
discussions in three ways. First, by focusing on domestic and 
international actors, it provides a context for the central theme of 
this volume—Ukraine’s security. Inter alia, it shows how a failure 
of all involved to resolve the internal crisis peacefully brought 
about the largest international crisis since the collapse of 
Yugoslavia. Second, it tests Levitsky and Way’s theory of linkage 
and leverage by applying it to the case of Yanukovych’s Ukraine. 
Specifically, it extends the integral part of the theory—the concepts 
of linkage and leverage—to non-democracies to compare Ukraine's 
ties both to the West and Russia. And third, it offers a single 
measure for the above-mentioned concepts. (Although this is a very 
approximate measure, a basis is provided for developing it in a 
more nuanced way.)  
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
presents Levitsky and Way’s concepts of linkage, leverage and 
organizational power and Tolstrup’s concept of “negative external 
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actor.” The second section applies them to assess both Western and 
Russian influence on Yanukovych’s government in the period from 
2010 to 2013. The third section summarizes these findings and 
demonstrates why the theory was not able to predict the outcome. 
Instead, it introduces agency—based factors (Yanukovych’s 
strategic mistakes made under pressure from Russia) to explain 
why he finally lost power.  
Western versus Russian Leverage  
Until now the discussion about the reasons for the breakdown and 
survival of hybrid regimes has not provided definitive answers 
(Geddes 1999; Gandhi & Przeworski 2007). While agency—
centered theories offer insights into past events (Bunce & Wolchik 
2011), structural theories seek to predict them. One such account 
was offered by Levitsky and Way (2010), who built a theory of 
hybrid regime dynamics by focusing on three variables: the density 
of ties to the West (linkage), the scope and cohesion of the state and 
governing party structures (organizational power), and the state’s 
vulnerability to Western democratizing pressure (leverage). 
Analyzing these factors across 35 states between 1990–2008, they 
found that democratization was more likely where linkage to the 
West was extensive, as in Eastern Europe or the Americas 
during the post-Cold War period. High linkage pushed autocrats to 
abandon power instead of keeping it by any means. In contrast, 
where linkage was low, as in the post-Soviet states, Western 
democratizing pressure was weaker. In these countries regime 
outcomes were primarily driven by the organizational power of 
incumbents. Where the state and governing party were well 
organized, incumbents were able to overcome opposition and 
retain power. Meanwhile, where the state and governing party 
were weak, the survival of the regime was threatened. When the 
organizational power of a regime was insufficient to prevent elite 
defection or crack down on protest, it was vulnerable to even weak 
opposition challenges. In such countries the third factor, 
incumbents’ vulnerability to Western leverage, was often decisive. 
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This, however, can be constrained by “black knights”—counter-
hegemonic powers whose political and economic potential help to 
blunt democratizing pressure. Where considerable antidemocratic 
leverage took place (as in the case of Russian influence upon 
Belarus), even weak regimes survived. Conversely, where Western 
leverage was high, such regimes were more likely to fall. The same 
has happened in Ukraine and Georgia, where “defective 
democracies” emerged in the wake of the Rose and the Orange 
revolutions. However, due to the lack of strong connections to the 
West, new leaders usually resorted to old practices and with the 
West acting inconsistently, nascent democracies were not able to 
consolidate. The matrix in table 1 presents regime outcomes 
resulting from the interaction of Western leverage and 
organizational power. 
Table 1.  Explaining regime outcomes 
 High leverage Low leverage 








Adapted from Levitsky & Way (2010) 
These three factors are important, but whether or not hybrid 
regimes survive is influenced by economic, historical and 
institutional factors as well. That is why some regime outcomes 
differed from those predicted by the theory, as was the case with 
“post-orange” Ukraine (Levitsky & Way 2010, 214, 234). Although 
in 2005–2010 Ukraine was rated a “free” country by Freedom 
House, democracy was not consolidated under Victor Yushchenko, 
Ukraine’s democratization being superficial and subject to internal 
conflicts, such as those between Yushchenko and Yulia 
Tymoshenko (Harasymiw 2007). Moreover, rent-seeking behavior 
among Ukrainian elites (Puglisi 2003) prevented them from 
institutionalizing the rules of the democratic game. This allowed 
Yushchenko’s successor to quickly expand his authority and 
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establish control over the legislature and judiciary. Indicative of 
this, just a year after Yanukovych gained power Freedom House 
expressed concern over the curtailing of democracy in Ukraine 
(2011). This trend only accelerated in the coming years, which were 
marked by such landmark events as the politically motivated trial 
and imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko (from August 5, 2011 to 
February 22, 2014), the passage of a package of anti-protest laws (in 
January 2014), and the killing of more than one hundred protesters 
in Kyiv in February 2014. Why did the democratically elected 
president of Ukraine allow this to happen? While many of his 
decisions require criminal investigation, the role of the “black 
knight”—meaning Russia—in precipitating these crises deserves 
closer scrutiny. One such attempt was Jakob Tolstrup’s 
introduction of the concept of a “negative external actor” (2009; 
2014). Tolstrup (2009) advanced a list of 18 indicators to assess the 
impact of a “negative external actor” on a targeted state, but he did 
not measure it. However, by quantifying Ukraine's linkage to the 
West and to Russia as of 2013, as well as Western versus Russian 
leverage on Ukraine and Ukraine's organizational power, we can 
empirically test Levitsky and Way’s theory and construct a single 
measure for the above-mentioned concepts. This has the potential 
to provide much broader insights into the interplay of the external 
and internal factors that led to the collapse of Yanukovych's regime. 
Measuring Linkage 
In Levitsly and Way’s theory linkage refers to the density of the 
economic, social and communication ties of the country in question 
to the West (meaning the EU and US). Intergovernmental ties are 
also subsumed under this rubric. High linkage would point to 
better chances for democratization. In order to test this theory (i.e., 
to explain Yanukovych's prolonged survival and rapid downfall), I 
apply the same methodology that Levitsky and Way (2010, 374–375) 
utilized. Specifically, I measure each dimension on a scale from 1 to 
5 (1 being the lowest score and 5 being the highest) based on 
Ukraine’s ranking relative to all non-Western countries in the 
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world. These scores will then be summed into a composite score 
and the result recalibrated on a scale from 0 to 1. Points will be 
given according to the place occupied in the ranking. From 1 to 15—
5 points, from 16 to 31—4 points, from 32 to 47—4 points, from 48 
to 63—3 points, from 64 to 79—2 points, and 80 and above—1 point. 
After estimating the linkage score for Ukraine as of 2013 (the 
last year for which data are available), I compare it with the score 
obtained by Levitsky and Way for the period 1990 to 2008. The 
change in these scores should reveal predictable changes in the 
dependent variable, namely whether the regime survives or is 
replaced. Given the actual result, namely the ouster of Yanukovych 
from power, we can see whether their theory is able to predict this 
outcome. 
Economic ties are measured by the extent of Ukraine’s trade 
with the EU countries (European Commission 2013). 
Communication ties are measured by the share of the Ukrainian 
population that uses the Internet and by international voice traffic 
(commensurate domestic traffic was not taken into consideration as 
there has been a steady reduction in the number of landline users 
over the course of the last decade, which has paralleled the 
expansion of alternative channels of communication [UBR 2012]). 
As of 2012 Ukraine ranked 68th in the world by Internet users 
(International Telecommunication Union 2013), and as of 2003 it 
ranked 36th in international voice traffic (Nation Master 2005). 
Social ties, meanwhile, are measured by looking at the number of 
Ukrainians living or working in the West (estimated at between 3—
3.5 million, or 7—7.2% of the population) (International 
Organization for Migration 2011). Trade ties are assessed at 4 
points, communication ties at 3 points and social ties at 2 points. 
Intergovernmental ties (measured by the potential for 
membership in the EU) are assessed at 2 points (on a scale from 1 
to 5, where 1 means the country has little prospect of joining, while 
5 means the country is a candidate state). Ukraine is still not on the 
list of “potential EU members,” as Yanukovych did not sign the EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) and Ukraine does not yet fit 
the political and economic criteria required to join the EU. 
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However, on this measure it scores 2 points, as Ukraine shares a 
border with four EU countries and is covered under the European 
Neighborhood Policy. These are the “pros” that most of the post-
Soviet, as well as some Balkan and most non-European countries, 
do not possess. After recalibrating the composite score to a scale 
from 0 to 1, Ukraine’s final score was 0.55, which corresponds to a 
medium level of linkage as defined by Levitsky and Way. The 
scores are summarized in table 2.  
Table 2.  Dynamics of linkage 
Linkage (density of ties) 1990/2008 2012/2013 
Economic ties   – 4 points 
Communication ties   – 3 points 
Social ties   – 2 points 
Intergovernmental ties    – 2 points 
Recalibrated score (0-1)  0.31 (Low) 0.55 (Medium) 
 Linkage scores for 1990–2008 were calculated by Levitsky and Way (2010); scores 
for 2012–2013 were calculated by the author.  
Although the value of the linkage score increased in 2013, Ukraine 
did not cross the threshold of high linkage states (0.69—0.97). This 
might happen, however, once Ukraine succeeds in terminating the 
war in the Donbas, demonstrates progress with reforms, and 
utilizes in full the AA, ratified by the EU in July 2017. Higher 
linkage, according to the theory, suggests that Ukraine has a chance 
to get back on the democratization track. 
Measuring Organizational Power  
Organizational power refers to the state’s coercive capacity and the 
strength of the ruling party. Both dimensions are measured by the 
scope and cohesion of the state and the party. According to 
Levitsky and Way, “scope refers to the effective reach of the state’s 
coercive apparatus” (2010, 58) or what other authors call its 
“infrastructural power” (Slayter & Fenner 2011). This is the extent 
and the quality of the “internal security sector” that includes the 
army, police, presidential guards, the security service and their 
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special units, and other coercive agencies (e.g., the financial police 
or tax inspectorate). 
Meanwhile, “cohesion refers to the level of compliance within 
the state apparatus” (Levitsky & Way 2010, 58). For compliance to 
be effective subordinates must follow their superiors’ commands. 
Similarly, the scope of the party “refers to the size of the party 
infrastructure, or the degree to which it penetrates the national 
territory and society” (Levitsky & Way 2010, 64). Cohesion 
demonstrates the incumbent’s ability to secure the cooperation of 
partisan allies within the government, the legislature and at the 
local and/or regional levels. Cohesion is greater when it is rooted 
in “nonmaterial ties” such as a common ethnic origin, belonging to 
a common social group or a history of shared struggle. Scores for 
party scope and cohesion and state scope and cohesion (low = 0; 
medium = 1; high = 2) are summed by the authors into a single 
composite score (0—8). Scores between 6 and 8 represent high 
organizational power, 5—medium high, 4—medium, 3— medium 
low, and between 0 and 2—low. The scores for organizational 
power are presented in table 3. 
Table 3.  Dynamics of organizational power* 
Organizational Power 1990/2008 2012/2013 
State Scope  High (2 points)  High (2 points) 
State Cohesion Low (0 point) Medium (1 point) 
Party scope  Low(0 points) High (2 points) 
Party cohesion  Low (0 points) Medium (1 points) 
State discretionary control over 
economy 
 
None  None 
Total  Low (2 points) High (6 points) 
*Organizational power scores for 1990–2008 were calculated by Levitsky & Way 
(2010); scores for 2012–2013 were calculated by the author. 
The organizational power of Ukraine’s regime has grown from low 
in the 1990s and 2000s to high in 2012/2013. This is a result of the 
concentration of power and the growth of the party of power. After 
Yanukovych was elected president, he managed to change the 
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constitution so that he had the same power as Leonid Kuchma had 
before the “Orange Revolution,” and then he subsequently 
expanded it even further. The Index of Presidential Authority, 
which was developed by Johannsen and Nørgaard (2003) and is 
measured on a scale from 0–100%, registered presidential authority 
in Ukraine at 46.9% during the period 2005–2010, rising to 52.7% 
during the period 2010–2014. This growth signifies a shift from 
“divided presidentialism” to “executive presidentialism.”1 Such a 
“blitzkrieg” in the concentration of presidential power was possible 
due to the devolution of constitutionalism in Ukraine. During the 
three years of Yanukovych’s rule, Ukraine went from a semi-
presidential system to super-presidential system of government 
(Matsiyevsky 2016, 74–75). 
The size of Ukraine’s coercive agencies (its Security Service 
numbered 33.500 officers, the Ministry of Internal Affairs 357,000 
employees [and its 13 special subunits 12–13,000], and the tax 
inspectorate 55,000 employees) strongly indicates that the state’s 
coercive power remained high in the period 2010–2013. Moreover, 
expenditures to maintain this apparatus were growing steadily; for 
example, beginning in 2010 the Ministry of Internal Affairs received 
approximately 1 billion additional hryvnias in funding per year, 
with funding increasing from 13.1 billion in 2010 to 16 billion 
hryvnias in 2013 (Burlakova 2013). The interference of these 
coercive agencies in public affairs has been emphasized by 
Freedom House (2012). However, despite the large size of 
Ukraine’s coercive apparatus and its Soviet style of management, a 
lack of incentivization and rampant corruption rendered these 
agencies unable to coerce effectively. Moreover, frequent changes 
in their leadership suggest that the President was unsure about the 
loyalty of his subordinates. Nonetheless, these agencies were used 
to intimidate opposition leaders, as well as to harass small- to 
medium-sized businesses, public figures and the media and, 
eventually, to confront the Euromaidan protesters in Kyiv and 
other cities (Gazeta UA 2013; Den’ 2013). 
                                                            
1  If the index falls in the range between 60 and 100%, it indicates the maximum 
concentration of presidential authority (see Matsiyevsky 2016, 67-75). 
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Although it was extensive in scope, there is little evidence that 
the state apparatus enjoyed high cohesion. There was no shared 
ideology or other non-material ties of unity present. Nor was a 
common ethnic origin or being from the Donbas region (the 
Russian-speaking portion of Ukraine where Yanukovych’s power 
base was located) a defining factor, as neither ethnicity nor being a 
Russian speaker constituted the dominant cleavage in the country 
(Economist 2013). The sole element of unity was the fear of being 
excluded from the extensive network of patronage. 
On the other hand, there was no evidence of disobedience 
among the personnel of the state apparatus. Specifically, there was 
no wage debt that would point at the low cohesion within the state 
apparatus. Instead, the number of personnel employed by the 
state’s coercive agencies was growing, as were their wages (TVI 
2013). Thus, I estimate the cohesion of the state to be at a “medium” 
level. 
Meanwhile, the scope of Yanukovych’s party of power, the 
Party of Regions (PoR), can be considered high. The governing 
party was the largest party in Ukraine, with its official membership 
exceeding 1.4 million (Didushok 2011). During the 2012 
parliamentary elections the PoR won more than 50% of electoral 
districts (115 out of 225), which was an indication of its vast 
mobilizational capacity. The extensive use of “administrative 
resources” by the party (local administrations were frequently 
headed by the leaders of PoR’s regional branches, allowing state 
budgetary funds to be distributed to political clients) (Gazeta.ua 
2012) revealed the extent to which it had effectively penetrated 
society. However, the PoR did not enjoy nonmaterial ties of unity 
(such as a shared ideology, a shared ethnicity or a history of shared 
struggle). Some sort of regional loyalty can only be attributed to the 
“old party bosses”—people like Nikolai Azarov, Volodymyr Rybak 
or Aleksandr Efremov. Of the nine “Family”2 representatives who 
penetrated the political council (politsovet) of the PoR in September 
2013, only five were from the Donetsk region (Zerkalo Nedeli 2013b). 
                                                            
2   The “Family” consisted of Victor Yanulovych’s closest allies, and was headed 
by his elder son Oleksandr. 
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This is a sign that regional loyalty was subverted by patronage and 
rent-seeking interests. On the other hand, PoR, like most of the 
Ukrainian parties, was a typical clientelistic party that attracted 
rent-seekers of all sorts. Having a large number of members in all 
regions of the state, the party could not maintain the unity of its 
cadres. As jailed PoR member Ihor Markov has publicly confessed, 
“the whole faction of the Party of Regions in parliament is 
controlled exclusively by fear. Someone is threatened of being 
deprived of his mandate, someone is threatened—by being 
deprived of business, to others—some other instruments of 
pressure are applied ” (Zerkalo Nedeli, 2013a). 
The most important indicator of cohesion within a party is 
whether it is in power or not. Until its sudden collapse in the end 
of February 2014, PoR controlled all the executive hierarchy. 
Although the representatives of the “Family” were not the 
members of the ruling party, they had the greatest influence in the 
Cabinet of Ministers (Podrobnosti 2012). Even before the split of the 
faction, PoR did not have a clear majority (it had 208 seats out of the 
226 needed to form a majority), and even with the help of the 
Communists, it could not utilize its coalition status to make 
decisions effectively. There were several individual defections, 
precipitated by the first violence against the protesters (on 
November 30, 2013), but the massive “exodus” took place only after 
the last attempt to disperse the Maidan failed. In just three days 
(between February 19–21) the PoR legislative faction lost 78 
members, dropping from 208 to 127 (Matsiyevsky 2016, 442–443). 
Considering all of the above, I classify the cohesion of 
Yanukovych’s party of power as “medium.” However, due to the 
concentration of power in the hands of the incumbent, the growth 
of the security apparatus and the effective penetration of the 
governing party into society, I consider the regime’s organizational 
power to be “high” (in keeping with Levitsky and Way’s 
terminology).  
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Measuring Leverage 
According to Levitsky and Way, Western leverage is measurable 
through “governments’ vulnerability to external democratizing 
pressure” (2010, 40–41). The extent to which such leverage is 
exerted is rooted in the strength of the country’s economy and the 
presence of counter-powers, whose support may function to blunt 
democratizing pressure. 
Leverage is measured along three dimensions: the size of the 
economy, oil production and possession, and the capacity to use 
nuclear weapons. Leverage is considered to be low when the 
country’s total GDP exceeds $100 billion USD (1995 figures). 
Ukraine is neither a major nor a secondary oil producer. Likewise, 
it does not have nuclear weapons, and until the beginning of the 
2013 crisis it was not a direct beneficiary of “black knight” 
assistance. Thus the only relevant dimension in the case of Ukraine 
is the size of its economy. 
Ukraine’s GDP in 2012 was $180 billion USD ($120 billion USD 
according to the 1995 exchange rate) (IMF, World Economic and 
Financial Surveys 2012), which exceeds the limit of $100 billion 
USD. This makes Ukraine a large economy. However, Ukraine’s 
economy to a great extent depends on global commodity prices, 
particularly for steel and chemicals. These two sectors generate 
about 30% of its GDP and provide for almost 40% of all monetary 
income to the country (Gerasymowa 2011). The real growth of GDP 
in 2013 was 0%, which signaled the country was on the verge of a 
new recession. Furthermore, by the end of 2013 Ukraine’s external 
debt amounted to 78.8% of its GDP (Macro Economy Meter 2013), 
while exchange reserves decreased to $20 billion USD (Trading 
Economics, Ukraine Foreign Exchange Reserves 2003–2017).  
In addition, the imposition of personal sanctions on Ukraine’s 
elite became a possibility once protests began in late November 
2013, making the threat of their imposition a tool of conditional 
pressure on the country’s ruling group. This tool, however, was not 
used as it might have been. Personalized sanctions, for instance, 
might have tipped the balance in favor of the West and precipitated 
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Yanukovych’s downfall. For this lever to be effective—to make 
Yanukovych abstain from violence and potentially abdicate—at 
least three conditions would have been necessary. First, 
personalized sanctions would have had to have been applied when 
the regime was at its most vulnerable (timing). Second, these 
sanctions would have had to have been extensive, targeting not 
only the president but also the ruling “Family.” The threat of 
extending the West’s “black list” to include Ukrainian oligarchs 
might also have pushed them to defect to the opposition, which, in 
turn, could have undermined the unity of the regime (scope). Three, 
any imposed sanctions would have had to have been coherent, 
reflecting a unified position on the part of the United States and EU 
(cohesion).  
The first country to introduce personal sanctions was Canada, 
which did so on January 28, 2014 (Government of Canada 2014). 
The EU announced personalized sanctions only on February 20, 
2014, and they only came into force on March 6, 2014, more than 
two weeks after the massive bloodshed in Kyiv. Meanwhile, the US 
announced sanctions against Yanukovych, Viktor Medvedchuk (a 
Ukrainian politician and oligarch) and eight Russian officials only 
on March 17, 2014 (Weigel 2014). These late sanctions hardly 
affected Yanukovych, as he had already fled to Moscow.  
The scope of the sanctions was also limited. The Initial EU list 
targeted 18 individuals of Yanukovych’s inner circle (Council 
Decision 2014/119/CFSP). Coherence was also undermined as 
strategic calculations entered the game, affecting not only unified 
coordination between the US and EU, but also within the EU itself. 
The Baltic states, Poland and some new EU members were 
concerned about the geopolitical implications of Ukraine slipping 
into Russia’s orbit, while “old” EU members, at least publicly, were 
more concerned with values. This is what Levitsky and Way have 
called “competing foreign policy objectives” (2010, 41). 
But why have both the United States and the EU abstained for 
so long from sanctioning corrupt Ukrainian officials? Apparently, 
Brussels and Washington had their reasons. While in the EU the 
“positive incentive” and conditionality were a dominant line of 
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thinking, for the Obama administration Ukraine barely registered 
on the radar. Both, however, sought to resolve the crisis through 
compromise, as they had done in 2004.  
In the US there were two views regarding sanctions—policy 
experts and leaders of international organizations such as David 
Kramer (president of Freedom House) and Steven Pifer (who 
served as the US ambassador to Ukraine between 1997 and 2000) 
championed sanctions (UNIAN 2012). In contrast, government 
officials instead promoted “engagement,” seeing it as preferable to 
isolating Ukraine, the idea being that maintaining dialogue could 
prevent Ukraine from slipping into authoritarianism and, 
subsequently into Russia’s orbit. 
Both the US and the EU understood that even targeted 
sanctions were a risky bet, and that they could have easily brought 
about the opposite effect of what was desired.  Furthermore, the 
EU’s decision to impose sanctions was not so much complicated by 
procedural difficulties as by political calculations. The EU’s “Open 
Door” policy towards Ukraine relied on using positive incentives 
rather than exerting overt pressure. The reactions of the US and EU 
to the Ukrainian crisis suggest that it was not the sanctions 
themselves, but rather the threat of imposing them, that was 
viewed as the West’s means of applying “soft pressure” on 
Ukrainian authorities (Matsiyevsky 2013, 155–56). However, a late 
and inconsistent response by the West rendered this tool 
ineffective. 
If personalized sanctions (such as a ban on entering the US and 
the EU, the freezing of bank accounts and launching of financial 
investigations) had been applied right after the first acts of violence 
occurred on the Maidan (November 30, 2013), or at least after the 
Ukrainian parliament passed a package of “dictatorship laws,”3 
they might have encouraged elite defections, preventing the 
escalation of violence and, potentially, Putin’s aggression against 
Ukraine. In short, if sanctions had been timely, coherent and 
extensive, they could have prevented the biggest international 
                                                            
3   A package of ten anti-protest laws, pushed through the parliament by the PoR 
on January 16, 2014. 
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crisis in Europe since the breakup of Yugoslavia. As Michael 
McFaul asserts, a credible threat of applying sanctions against 
Kuchma in 2004 prevented him from using violence against 
protesters and opened the road to the peaceful transfer of power 
(2007, 71–72). If the policy of engagement reasonably prevailed 
until the failed Vilnius summit, why did the West retain it for 
almost 90 days during the crisis? There are at least three factors that 
can shed some light on this issue.  
First, as the crisis deteriorated, the West exhibited no 
consistent policy towards either Ukraine or Russia. In the EU the 
dominant belief was that the AA would be signed, as EU officials 
saw the fate of AA as primarily if not solely dependent on their own 
will. This overconfidence was reflected in not having a “plan B” 
regarding the AA. Second, the competing foreign policy objectives 
of the EU and the US made it difficult to arrive at reasonable 
strategies to confront Putin. Sanctioning Yanukovych after the 
failed Vilnius summit would not provide the means to deter Putin 
in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the West preferred to react as if 
Yanukovych was a sovereign player. An inability (or 
unwillingness) to envision Putin’s aggressive intentions resulted in 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Third, as the EU and US both had 
“strategic” concerns that sanctions could provoke a spiral of 
internal violence, they became preoccupied with decreasing 
Ukraine’s “systemic vulnerability” (Doner, Ritchie & Slater 2005). 
Sanctions could have potentially weakened the organizational 
power of the regime, but could also have increased anti-
governmental protest, leading to internal conflict and the breakup 
of the state. As sanctions imposed on undemocratic leaders have 
rarely had a curative effect (Escribà-Folch 2012), the West preferred 
an evolutionary scenario to a chaotic and unpredictable “people’s 
revolution.” 
Likewise, the reaction of the former Ukrainian president 
proved that the threat of imposing sanctions was not credible. The 
West expected Yanukovych to act rationally, that is, to abandon 
power after holding of early elections (the central issue of the 
compromise reached on February 21, 2014) and thereby secure his 
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physical and political survival until then. The President, however, 
relying on a different logic, made several grave mistakes and finally 
lost power. The West likewise made at least three strategic 
mistakes: hesitating to sanction Yanukovych and his close allies; 
not deterring Putin from interfering in Ukraine; and intervening too 
late in the crisis. The EU’s diplomatic mission to “channel” the crisis 
through compromise was also futile for several reasons. First, EU 
officials missed the moment when the crisis turned into a 
revolution,4 as they were still trying to negotiate a deal. Revolution, 
however, could hardly be tempered by compromise. Second, the 
EU miscalculated the players. While EU diplomats routinely sought 
to bring “the ruling elite” and “the opposition” to the table, the real 
player was not the opposition, but the people protesting in Kyiv 
and throughout Ukraine. This explains the third mistake—the EU’s 
unacceptable offer5. For protesters, agreeing to such a compromise 
was unacceptable, as it would mean they would have to forgive 
Yanukovych for more than one hundred deaths and tolerate him as 
a president for another year.  
To sum up, two observations may be made. First, poor 
economic performance and the capacity to apply sanctions 
increased Ukraine’s vulnerability to the Western pressure. Though 
the nominal leverage was low, the above factors suggest that 
potential leverage was at a “medium” level.  
Second, though potential Western leverage was actually 
greater than might have been expected, it was not applied in a 
timely, extensive and coherent manner. The late and inconsistent 
response to Ukraine’s crisis made sanctions an uncredible threat. 
Table 4 summarizes the values of linkage, leverage and 
organizational power prior to the 2013 crisis in comparison to 1990–
2008 (as measured by Levitsky & Way).  
                                                            
4  Unlike in 2004, in 2014 the author detected 7 out of 11 analytically defined 
attributes of a revolution, allowing the latter to be defined as a political, but not 
a social, revolution (Matsiyevsky 2016. 444-449). 
5  An agreement on February 21, 2014, facilitated by the EU representatives—
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Radoslaw Sikorski and Eric Fournier—assumed that 
Yanukovych would stay in power until at least the end of 2014 in exchange for 
limiting his prerogatives by restoring the constitution of 2004.  
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Table 4.  The dynamics of linkage, leverage and organizational 
power scores 
Dimension 1990–2008 2012–2013 
Linkage  0.31 (Low) 0.55 (Medium) 
Economic ties  - 4 
Social ties  - 2 
Communication ties - 3 
Governmental ties - 2 
Leverage High Low/Medium 
GDP (in billion USD).  137 180 
Organizational Power 2 (Low) 6 (High)  
State scope 2 2 
State cohesion 0 1 
Party scope 0 2 
Party cohesion 0 1 
How do these empirical findings relate to the theory? The theory 
predicts that under conditions of low/medium linkage and 
leverage but high organizational power, the regime will be 
unstable, but will survive. In 2014 as in 2004 the actual outcome—
regime change—differed from the predicted outcome. Why is this? 
With regard to 2004, Levitsky and Way admit that this outcome was 
rooted more in domestic processes—limited organizational power, 
elite defection and a strong opposition—rather than external 
pressure (2010, 213–214, 219). In contrast to Leonid Kuchma, 
however, Victor Yanukovych managed to stay in power for the first 
three months of the crisis before finally fleeing to Russia (Wilson 
2014, chap. 4; Aslund 2015, 101–109; Dragneva & Wolczuk 2015, 83–
99). I argue that Yanukovych’s prolonged survival can be explained 
by three factors: the growth of Ukraine’s organizational power, the 
West’s miscalculated approach to sanctions, and Russia’s “black 
knight” support. Two of these three factors have been discussed 
above. Now I turn to the role of Russia to describe how Putin’s 
policy towards Yanukovych prolonged his stay in power, but 
ultimately brought about massive anti-regime mobilization, 
resulting in his eventual toppling. 
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Turning to the Other Side: Russia's Influence on 
Ukraine  
Clearly, Russia has interests in Ukraine. But how did these interests 
translate into an ability to influence Ukraine’s political process? In 
terms of Levitsky and Way, what was the role of the “black knight” 
in affecting the fate of Yanukovych’s regime? More precisely, what 
was the extent of Ukraine’s linkage to Russia and what leverage did 
Russia exercise over Ukraine under Yanukovych? Considering 
Yanukovych’s impulsive decision to not sign the AA in Vilnius 
(Wood, Pomeranz, Wayne Merry & Trudolyubov 2015, 6–63), the 
presence of Russian “consultants” (including Putin’s aide Vladislav 
Surkov) in Ukraine for the entirety of the crisis (Wilson 2014, 108–
110), the alleged involvement of Russian snipers in the Maidan 
shootings (Wilson 2014, 89), and Yanukovych’s appeal to Putin to 
send troops to Crimea (Lederer & Spielmann 2014) after he had fled 
to Russia all indicate that Putin was able to capitalize on Ukraine’s 
linkage to Russia and turn it into leverage (Hughes & Sasse 2016). 
On the other hand, this leverage was only capable of influencing 
Ukraine’s corrupt elites and part of the population in Crimea and 
the Donbas; it proved largely ineffective in spreading the “Russian 
spring” further across Ukraine.  
Levitsky and Way acknowledge the role of “black knights” in 
supporting authoritarian leaders, but they do not develop it 
theoretically. By extending the concept of linkage and leverage to 
encompass non-democracies, we may gain valuable insights not 
only into Yanukovych’s extended struggle for power (and his 
downfall), but also the broader dynamics of post-Soviet hybrid 
regimes and what may be termed “autocracy promotion.”  
Let us take a cursory glance at Ukraine’s linkage to Russia. 
Like the linkage to the West, it may be measured along four 
dimensions: economic ties, social ties, intergovernmental ties, and 
communication ties. As previously, each dimension below is 
assessed on a scale from 1 to 5, with the resulting scores summed 
and recalibrated into a range from 0 to 1.  However, while Levitsky 
and Way ascribe points based on a country’s position relative to all 
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non–Western countries in the world, I ascribe points based on 
Ukraine’s ranking relative to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS).  
As of 2013, Ukraine’s economic ties to Russia were greater 
than just one component (trade) would reflect. Prior to 
independence, Ukraine was an integral part of the Soviet military-
industrial complex. And while Ukraine’s share of trade with Russia 
declined gradually after independence, in 2013 Russia was still its 
largest trade partner  (trade with Russia that year amounted to 38.2 
billion USD), while Ukraine was the fourth largest trading partner 
of Russia (for which trade with Ukraine accounted for 35.5 billion 
USD). Moreover, Ukraine’s negative balance-in-trade with Russia 
in 2013 was 1.9 billion USD, which made Ukraine’s economy highly 
dependent on the Russian market (Embassy of Ukraine in Russian 
Federation, n.d.).  
As with economic ties, social ties to Russia are greater than just 
the number of Ukrainians living or working in Russia. However, 
just along this dimension, Ukrainians in Russia make up the largest 
single diaspora group. The official Russian census in 2010 reported 
that 1.9 million ethnic Ukrainians were living in Russia, 
representing over 1.4% of the total population and making 
Ukrainians the third most numerous ethnic group in the country 
after ethnic Russians and Tatars (2010 National Census in Russia). 
Similarly, until the annexation of Crimea, Russians comprised the 
largest ethnic minority in Ukraine at 8.3 million individuals, or 
17.3% of the overall population of Ukraine (Russians in Ukraine, 
n.d.). And while the Russian ethnic minority is decreasing in 
Ukraine, Russia remains the largest external job market for 
Ukrainians (Malinovska 2014).  
With regard to intergovernmental ties, Ukraine was neither a 
full member of the CIS nor a member of any other economic, 
political or security organization together with Russia. Russia’s 
effort to make Ukraine a member of the Customs Union (CU), along 
with Belarus and Kazakhstan, failed largely due to the Euromaidan 
protest and Yanukovych’s escape to Russia.  
Yuriy Matsiyevsky 
Contributor's copy - personal use only
154  YURIY MATSIYEVSKY 
Finally, communication ties between Ukraine and Russia are 
not less extensive than economic or social ties, although this 
dimension is significantly harder to measure. As of 2009 Ukraine 
had the largest share (32%) of the voice traffic going out of Russia. 
(Zolotova 2010). Consequently, economic, social and 
communication ties are assessed at 5 points, and governmental ties 
at 2 points. After recalibrating their sum to fit a range from 0 to 1, 
the obtained linkage score was 0.85. Although this is a very 
approximate measure, Ukraine’s linkage to Russia under 
Yanukovych appeared to be higher than its linkage to the West 
(0.53). 
Strong linkage to Russia explains not just Ukraine’s impasse 
with reforms and democratization; it also explains why for the 
greater number of elites and many ordinary Ukrainians Russia 
remained a model state. Little wonder then that even after three 
years of warfare in the Donbas, some 40% of Ukrainians retain a 
positive image of Russia (UNIAN 2017). This extensive spider-web 
of ties to Russia, which extend beyond linguistic, religious and 
cultural affinities, allowed Putin to turn linkage into strong 
leverage. But how comparable was Russia’s leverage to the West’s 
leverage when it came to Yanukovych’s Ukraine? To apply 
Levitsky and Way’s concept of leverage to Russia is problematic, as 
it was designed to measure Western democratizing pressure. 
However, one potential way to measure undemocratic leverage is 
to apply Tolstrup’s concept of “negative external actor.” In his 
work, Tolstrup sought to develop an analytical framework to 
explain Russia’s policies of “managed stability” and “managed 
instability” on neighboring states. By summarizing previous works 
he selected 18 levers and combined them into three groupings: 
military, political and economic.6 Tosltrup, however, does not offer 
                                                            
6  The 18 levers are: military interventions; military threats; military bases abroad; 
military support to secessionist republics; peacekeeping forces; military 
alliances dominated by Russia; support for anti-Western groups; opposition to 
pro-Western groups; multilateral organizations dominated by Russia; support 
for secessionist republics; control of the CIS Election Monitoring Organization; 
Russian state TV; the Russian diaspora; trade embargos; subsidies; Russia’s 
energy monopoly; credits; and debt payments (Tolstrup 2009, 929).  
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any quantitative measure for assessing these levers, which makes it 
difficult to apply them in a comparative case study. As the first step 
in developing a quantitative measure for the concept of “negative 
external actor,” I ascribe 1 point to each lever that is present/active 
at the time of Yanukovych’s presidency. The resultant scores will 
be summed into a composite score (range: 0–18). Scores from 1 to 6 
would represent low leverage, while 7 to 13 would represent 
medium leverage, and 14 to 18 would represent high leverage. 
Acknowledging that not all 18 levers are of the same weight (and 
that there exist some other potential levers, such as informal ties, 
bribes and various forms of blackmail), let me call the former 
“nominal” leverage. This would allow for making a comparison 
(albeit very rough) between Russian and Western leverage in the 
case of Yanukovych’s Ukraine.  
Of the six military levers (military interventions, military 
threats, military bases abroad, military support to secessionist 
republics, peacekeeping forces, and military alliances dominated 
by Russia) only “military bases abroad” was empirically relevant.7 
Of seven political levers, meanwhile, five were visibly present: 
support for anti-Western groups; multilateral organizations 
dominated by Russia; control of the CIS Election Monitoring 
Organization; Russian state TV; and the Russian diaspora. Of the 
five economic levers, all five were relevant: energy monopoly; trade 
embargoes; subsidies; credits; and debt payments. For the purpose 
of this study, let us assume that all levers have an equal weight. 
Having noted the presence of 11 out of a total of 18 possible levers, 
we can see that Russian leverage falls in the category of “medium” 
leverage (range: 7 to 13), suggesting that the West’s leverage 
(medium) was roughly matched by that of Russia.  
As mentioned above, this measure reflects what may be 
termed “potential” or “nominal leverage.” As in the case of the 
West, Russian leverage was actually higher than represented by the 
calculated score, as the latter does not include vast informal levers, 
                                                            
7  Though “military threat” (to annex Crimea) was mentioned in some media 
outlets, until we have documented proof it was used by Russian authorities to 
pressure Yanukovych, we cannot include it as a relevant lever. 
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such as corruption and political or military blackmail. Tolstrup’s 
list also does not include cultural levers (e.g., religion, language) 
and the identity politics that Russia has actively pursued in 
Ukraine.  
Three conclusions ensue. First, even given the limited number 
of quantitatively observable levers, we can see why Russia was able 
to prevent Yanukovych from signing the AA, to annex Crimea and 
to launch a hybrid war in Ukraine. What Russia could not affect, 
however, was the reaction of ordinary Ukrainians. Initially 
mobilized to protest the government’s decision to put the signing 
of the AA on hold, the protesters became radicalized, and the 
protests assumed a life of their own after the government decided 
to violently suppress the Maidan. Second, as Russia’s leverage over 
Yanukovych was matched by that of the West, Russia’s policy of 
“managed stability” (i.e., support for Yanukovych) prolonged his 
stay in power, but could not secure his political survival. After the 
collapse of Yanukovych’s government, Putin swiftly changed his 
role in Ukraine from one of stabilizing to destabilizing the new 
government. Third, the answer to the original question (why 
Yanukovych managed to survive three months of political crisis) 
can be attributed in part to the Russia’s “black knight” role. As this 
study shows, if the linkage of the country in question [Ukraine] is 
higher to the “black knight” state [Russia] than to the West—
democratization is not likely to occur. And, if Russia’s leverage on 
the country in question [Ukraine] is equal to/or higher than that of 
the West, Russia’s policies of managed stability and instability can 
be more effective than Western democratizing efforts. By extending 
the theory to non-democracies and by offering a single measure for 
Western versus Russian leverage on Ukraine, this study invites the 
development of more sophisticated techniques for measuring 
“black knight” leverage vis-à-vis the West. Finally, Levitsky and 
Way’s theory underestimates the role of agency, namely the role 
leaders, elites and the masses play in explaining regime dynamics. 
The futility of focusing only on one set of variables is another reason 
why the theory was unable to predict the outcome of the Ukrainian 
case. This suggests that it would be worthwhile to develop more 
Yuriy Matsiyevsky 
Contributor's copy - personal use only
 THE BREAKDOWN OF THE YANUKOVYCH REGIME   157 
integrative accounts of the dynamics of hybrid regimes in post-
communist Eurasia (and beyond). 
Agency-Based Factors Affecting the Fall of 
Yanukovych 
The factors discussed above help explain why Yanukovych 
appeared to be immune to both Western pressure and “people 
power” for almost three months of the crisis. Until the third violent 
attempt to disperse the Maidan failed (it occurred between 
February 18–21, 2014) he managed to prevent any significant 
defections from the three key pillars of his regime: the Party of 
Regions’ parliamentary faction, the “oligarchs,” and the security 
sector. With the West imposing no sanctions and Putin at his side, 
Yanukovych virtually neutralized structural democratizing 
pressure. This indicates that Yanukovych could have likely 
survived until the next presidential elections, whenever they were 
to be held. 
The fall of Yanukovych was triggered by several agency-based 
factors, most importantly by his personal strategic blunders, which 
were apparently made under pressure from Moscow.8 On the one 
hand Russia provided political support (by publicly denouncing 
the protests), economic assistance (by providing 3 billion USD out 
of a promised 15 billion USD bailout and a 30% discount on natural 
gas), and security (by sending Putin’s aide Vladislav Surkov and a 
group of Russian agents to Kyiv) to support Yanukovych. On the 
other hand, the growing pressure from Moscow ultimately turned 
out to be counterproductive. The Kremlin expected state-led 
violence would disperse the Maidan. The effect, however, was just 
the opposite: each attempt to crack down on the protesters 
increased their organizational capacity, numbers, and persistence. 
                                                            
8  The decision to use force against the protesters has been attributed to pressure 
from the Russian government and its political consultants in Ukraine (chief 
among them Vladislav Surkov). The latter were allegedly composed of two 
groups of Russian special agents charged with coordinating the “antiterrorist 
operation” in Kyiv (Wilson 2014, 89). 
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State-led violence also provoked the radicalization of the protesters. 
As the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) reported, 
69.9 % of the total number of protesters came onto the Maidan in 
direct reaction to the violence exhibited against the peaceful protest 
movement on November 30, 2013 (KIIS  2013). A failure to predict 
the outcome of these harsh decisions, apparently forced on him by 
the Kremlin, was Yanukovych’s greatest strategic mistake. It 
precipitated the collapse of his regime in five ways.  
First, after several failed attempts to violently disperse the 
Maidan, the regime lost its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 
Despite reshuffling the command of the armed forces, there was a 
constant danger that the officers would not obey orders. After one 
unsuccessful attempt to mobilize the armed forces against 
protesters, the military stayed out of the conflict.9 Second, after the 
Ukrainian parliament adopted a package of anti-protest laws 
(“dictatorship laws”) on January 16, 2014, 10 western and central 
regions effectively slipped out of the government’s control (as 
evinced by the occupation of regional administrative buildings). 
The ensuing “multiple sovereignty,” severe political crisis, massive 
mobilization, and the subsequent split of elites ensured that the 
crisis would turn into a political revolution.  
Third, the power vertical collapsed after the third failed 
attempt to violently disperse the Maidan. In the wake of massive 
bloodshed in Kyiv, the Party of Regions faction in parliament 
crumbled in just three days. However, the first signs of a coming 
crisis had already appeared two months earlier, when after the first 
instance of violence in Kyiv two prominent party figures—Inna 
Bohoslovska and Davyd Zhvania—publicly quit the party. Then on 
February 19, 2014 seven MPs defected, and later that same day 
another eleven followed. And on February 20, 2014 the newly 
appointed head of the Kyiv City State Administration, Viktor 
Makeyenko, expressed his support for the residents of Kyiv and 
                                                            
9  On February 19, 2014 the acting Minister of Defense, Pavel Lebedev, 
acknowledged sending airborne troops from Dnipropetrovsk to Kyiv. 
However, due to an accident en route the convoy of 25 trucks did not reach its 
destination, instead returning to the base (Miakshykov 2014).  
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quit the PoR. Shortly afterwards more than twenty deputies of the 
PoR simply left the country. As a result, the Party of Regions faction 
in parliament virtually ceased to exist. In just three days it had 
shrunk by almost 40%, going from 205 to 127 deputies (Verhovna 
rada of Ukraine, n.d.).  
Fourth, the collapse of the regime was also precipitated by its 
defeat in the “information war.” Live broadcasting from Kyiv’s 
central square (the Maidan) became a focal point for sustaining 
mass mobilization. For the entire period of crisis, there were at least 
three national TV stations (Channel 5, News 24, and Espresso TV) 
and three online TV channels (Hromads’ke [Public TV], U-stream, 
and Spil’no TV), in addition to dozens of online streamers, who 
were permanently broadcasting from the Maidan. Even though 
they were occasionally disrupted, mobile and internet connections 
allowed protestors to maintain communication, both between 
themselves and the outside world. 
Finally, although European mediators reached a deal with 
Yanukovych and the opposition on February 21, 2014, the people 
on the Maidan refused to accept it after witnessing massive 
bloodshed. It was the inability of all the parties involved to take 
sufficient account of the dynamics on the ground that turned this 
crisis into a political revolution.  
Conclusions 
This study focused on international competition over Ukraine prior 
to the 2014 revolution. It combined structural- and agency-based 
variables to explain why Victor Yanukovych was able to withstand 
both Western pressure and “people power” for some three months 
prior to finally abandoning his post and fleeing Ukraine. In 
particular, it set out to re-conceptualize Levitsky and Way’s 
concepts of linkage and leverage by extending them to Russia, 
while testing the theory by applying it to the specific case of 
Ukraine.  
The empirical findings yield four conclusions. First, while 
structural factors (like the growth of the regime’s organizational 
Yuriy Matsiyevsky 
Contributor's copy - personal use only
160  YURIY MATSIYEVSKY 
power, Russian leverage over Ukraine and the West’s inconsistent 
approach to sanctions) extended Yanukovych’s stay in power, it 
was agency-based factors (first and foremost his flawed decision to 
crack down on protesters) that most contributed to his downfall. 
The latter are not taken into account by Levitsky and Way’s theory, 
which explains why the actual outcome (regime change) differs 
from the predicted outcome (regime survival). 
Second, this study argues that the capacity to apply sanctions 
on Yanukovych’s regime could have made Western leverage more 
effective. Despite Yanukovych’s concentration of presidential 
power and Russia’s support for him, the West could have facilitated 
the regime transition and prevented the outbreak of political 
violence if sanctions had been applied not after, but before, 
Yanukovych actually lost power. Late and inconsistent sanctions 
affirmed that the West expected Yanukovych to stay in power until 
the next elections. This expectation proved a mistake, as it sought 
to repeat the 2004 compromise solution to the crisis. But unlike in 
2004, the 2014 crisis spiraled out of control and grew into a political 
revolution, which led Russia to launch a counter-revolution. The 
latter now poses not only an existential threat to Ukraine, but also 
represents a danger to the entire postwar international order.  
Third, nominal Russian leverage over Ukraine appeared to be 
greater than that of the West. This explains why Putin was able to 
disrupt the signing of Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the 
EU in Vilnius. While the EU attempted to resolve the crisis through 
compromise, Russia sought to keep Ukraine in its orbit by pushing 
Yanukovych toward a violent, confrontational scenario. As soon as 
this plan failed, Putin changed his policy of “managed stability” to 
“managed instability” in Ukraine.  
Finally, although Western and Russian leverage both 
weakened Yanukovych’s regime, its downfall was brought about 
from within the state. External pressure, especially from the 
Russian side, had considerable impact on elites, but it hardly 
affected the majority of Ukrainians. “People power” was stronger 
than either the West’s inconsistent support or Russia’s efforts at 
counter-balancing it. The issue was that the unwanted Ukrainian 
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revolution caught the West by surprise. Having no consistent 
policy either towards Ukraine or Russia, the West could not prevent 
Putin from annexing Crimea and igniting a hybrid war in the east 
of Ukraine. An inability to learn hard lessons from the Ukrainian 
crisis (and take a unified position to prevent further aggressive 
steps by Russia) could ultimately become very costly for the West. 
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